Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) are high-level protocols describing the course of action an agent should perform as a function of its knowledge. The use of KBPs for expressing action policies in AI planning has been surprisingly overlooked. Given that to each KBP corresponds an equivalent plan and vice versa, KBPs are typically more succinct than standard plans, but imply more on-line computation time.
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) [7] are high-level protocols which describe the actions an agent should perform as a function of its knowledge, such as, typically, if Kϕ then π else π , where K is an epistemic modality and π, π are subprograms.
Thus, in a KBP, branching conditions are epistemically interpretable, and deduction tasks are involved at execution time (on-line). KBPs can be seen as a powerful language for expressing policies or plans, in the sense that epistemic branching conditions allow for exponentially more compact representations. In contrast, standard plans (as in contingent planning) or standard policies (as in POMDPs) either are sequential or branch on objective formulas, and hence can be executed efficiently, but they can be exponentially larger (see for instance [1] ).
Having said this, KBPs have surprisingly been overlooked in the perspective of planning. Initially developed for distributed computing, they have been considered in AI for agent design [5] and game theory [10] . For planning, the only works we know of are by Reiter [17] , who gives an implementation of KBPs in Golog; Classen and Lakemeyer [6] , who implement KBPs in a decidable fragment of the situation calculus; Herzig et al. [9] , who discuss KBPs for propositional planning problems, and Laverny and Lang [12, 13] , who generalize KBPs to belief -based programs allowing for uncertain action effects and noisy observations. None of these papers really addresses computational issues.
A few papers in the AI planning literature have studied planning with incomplete knowledge where the agent's knowledge is represented by means of epistemic modalities, such as Petrick and Bacchus [16] . Another recent stream of work focuses on describing planning problems within the framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Löwe et al. [14] , Bolander and Andersen [3] ). Nilogy and Ramanujam [15] also make use of epistemic logic for planning with "action trials", where action feedback corresponds to the action succeeding or failing. However, in all these papers, epistemic formulas are used only for representing the current knowledge state and the effects of actions, not in branching conditions, which bear on observations only.
Recently, [11] have started to address the computational issues of planning with knowledge-based programs, by identifying the complexity of plan verification under various assumptions on the available constructs for plans and the available actions. Even if they briefly address the succinctness of knowledge-based programs compared to standard plans, the discussion remains at an informal level; moreover they do not consider at all the plan existence problem, which is even more important for practical planning purposes than plan verification. This paper contributes to fill these two gaps.
We define knowledge-based programs and planning problems in Section 3. Section 4 formally relates KBPs to standard plans, by showing that both have the same expressivity, but that KBPs are exponentially more succinct than standard plans. Section 5 focuses on the plan existence problem. We could think that because KBPs and standard plans are equally expressive, KBP existence is equivalent to standard plan existence, the complexity of which has been investigated, especially by Rintanen [18] . This is partly true, and indeed some results about KBP existence directly follow from these earlier results. This is however not true for (a) "small" KBP existence problems, where the objective is to find a small enough KBP allowing to reach the goal; (b) purely epistemic plan existence, which have surprisingly been ignored. Our main results are the following: (a) the existence of a bounded-size solution KBP is EXPSPACEcomplete, and falls down to Σ p 3 -complete if loops are disallowed, to Σ p 2 -complete for the restriction to ontic actions and the restriction to epistemic actions and positive goals; (b) purely epistemic plan existence is PSPACE-complete, and coNP-complete if the goal is a positive epistemic formula. Further issues are briefly evoked in the conclusion.
PRELIMINARIES
A KBP is executed by an agent in an environment. We model what the agent knows about the current state (of the environment and internal variables) in the propositional epistemic logic S5. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be propositional symbols. A state is a valuation of X; e.g., x1x2 is the state where x1 is false and x2 is true. We sometimes use the notation x with x 1 = x and x 0 =x. A knowledge state M for S5 is a nonempty set of states (those the agent considers possible): at any point in time, the agent has a knowledge state M ⊆ 2 X and the current state is some s ∈ M . For instance, M = {x1x2,x1x2} means that the agent knows x1 and x2 have different values in the current state.
Formulas of S5 are built up from X, the usual connectives, and the knowledge modality K. An S5 formula is objective if it does not contain any occurrence of K. Objective formulas are denoted by ϕ, ψ, etc. whereas general S5 formulas are denoted by Φ, Ψ etc. For an objective formula ϕ, we denote by Mods(ϕ) the set of all states which satisfy ϕ (i.e., Mods(ϕ) = {s ∈ 2 X , s |= ϕ}). The size |Φ| of an S5 formula Φ is the total number of occurrences of propositional symbols, connectives and modality K in Φ. It is well-known (see, e.g., [7] ) that any S5 formula is equivalent to a formula without nested K modalities; therefore we disallow them. An S5 formula Φ is purely subjective if objective formulas occur only in the scope of K, and a purely subjective S5 formula is in knowledge negative normal form (SKNNF) if the negation symbol ¬ occurs only in objective formulas (in the scope of K) or directly before a K modality. Note that any purely subjective S5 formula Φ can be rewritten into an equivalent SKNNF of polynomial size using de Morgan's laws. An SKNNF formula is positive if the negation symbol never appears in front of a K modality. For instance, K¬(p∧q)∨¬(Kr ∨K¬r) is not in SKNNF, but is equivalent to the SKNNF formula K¬(p ∧ q) ∨ (¬Kr ∧ ¬K¬r), which is not a positive SKNNF, whereas K¬(p ∧ q) ∧ (Kr ∨ K¬¬r) is a positive SKNNF.
The satisfaction of a purely subjective formulas depends only on a knowledge state M , not on the actual current state (see, e.g., [7] ): M satisfies an atom Kϕ, written M |= Kϕ, if for all s ∈ M , s |= ϕ, and the semantics for combinations of atoms with ¬, ∧, ∨ is defined as usual.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROGRAMS AND PLANNING PROBLEMS
We briefly recall the essential definitions about KBPs [11] . Given a set AO of ontic actions and a set AE of epistemic actions, a knowledge-based program (KBP) is defined inductively as follows:
• the empty plan π λ is a KBP;
• any action α ∈ AO ∪ AE is a KBP;
• if π and π are KBPs, then π; π is a KBP;
• if π, π are KBPs and Φ is a formula in SKNNF , then if Φ then π else π endif is a KBP;
• if π is a KBP and Φ is a formula in SKNNF, then while Φ do π endwhile is a KBP.
The class of while-free KBPs is obtained by omitting the while construct. The size |π| of a KBP π is defined to be the number of occurrences of actions, plus the size of branching conditions, in π. Finally, we sometimes view while-free KBPs as trees, with some nodes labelled by actions and having one child (the KBP following this action), and some nodes labelled by an epistemic formula and having two children (for if constructs). Accordingly, we refer to branches of KBPs.
Let X = {x | x ∈ X}, denoting the values of variables after an action has been taken. An ontic action α is represented by its theory Σα, which is a propositional formula over X ∪ X such that for all states s ∈ 2 X , the set {s ∈ 2 X | ss |= Σα} is nonempty, and is exactly the set of possible states after α is performed in s. For instance, with X = {x1, x2}, the action α which nondeterministically reinitializes the value of x1 has the theory Σα = (x 2 ↔ x2). Observe that ontic actions are nondeterministic in general; moreover, when taking such an action the agent does not know which outcome occurred. We sometimes omit the "'frame axioms" of the form x i ↔ xi from Σα, e.g., we write x 1 ↔ ¬x1 for the action of switching x1, whatever the other variables.
Now, an epistemic action α is represented by its feedback theory Ωα, which is a list of positive epistemic atoms of the form Ωα = (Kϕ1, . . . , Kϕn). For instance, the epistemic action which senses the value of an objective formula ϕ is denoted by test(ϕ), and its feedback theory is Ω test(ϕ) = (Kϕ, K¬ϕ). We require that feedbacks be exhaustive (ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn is tautological), so that in any state an epistemic action yields a feedback, but we do not require them to be mutually exclusive; if several feedbacks are possible in some state, one is chosen nondeterministically at execution time.
Operational Semantics.
The agent executing a KBP starts in some knowledge state M 0 , and at any timestep t until the execution terminates, it has a current knowledge state M t . When execution comes to a branching condition Φ, Φ is evaluated in the current knowledge state (i.e., the agent decides whether M t |= Φ holds).
The knowledge state M t is defined inductively as the progression of M t−1 by the action executed between t − 1 and t. Formally, given a knowledge state M ⊆ 2 X and an ontic action α, the progression of M by α is defined to be Prog( X (resp. a feedback Kϕ) for each ontic (resp. epistemic) action encountered. We say that two KBPs π and π are equivalent (resp. equivalent in M 0 ) if they have exactly the same traces in any initial knowledge state (resp. in M 0 ).
KBPs as Plans.
We define a knowledge-based planning problem P to be a tuple (I, AO, AE, G) , where I = Mods(ϕ 0 ) is the initial knowledge state, G is an SKNNF S5 formula called the goal, and AO (resp. AE) is a set of ontic (resp. epistemic) actions together with their theories. Then a KBP π (using actions in AO ∪ AE) is said to be a (valid) plan for P if all its traces in I are finite, and for all traces
Interesting restrictions of knowledge-based planning problems are obtained either by restricting the form of KBPs (by disallowing loops, or by bounding the size of the KBP), by restricting the set of actions allowed (by requiring all actions to be ontic or all actions to be epistemic), or by adding a restriction on the goal (by requiring it to be a positive KNNF). The restriction to positive goals deserves some comments. After all, one may think that goals should always be positive -and in most of practical cases they will indeed be: why should a robot care about not knowing something? The more it knows, the easier it is to make accurate decisions. This is true in a single-agent environment. Now, even if our paper does not address full multi-agent environments (which are much more complex to handle), it allows to represent at least a simple class of multi-agent planning problems, where only one agent is able to act but other agents observe its actions and feedbacks. But there might be facts which the acting agent wants to avoid the other to learn, and under the assumption that observations are considered as public announcements, the acting agent will also want not to learn these facts 1 .
SUCCINCTNESS
So as to measure the benefit of using KBPs as plans, we compare them to what we call standard policies. We define such policies exactly as KBPs, but allowing branching on feedbacks just obtained via an epistemic action, rather than on unrestricted epistemic formulas. What we have in mind here is to compare KBPs to reactive policies, for which the next action to take can be found efficiently at execution time.
Definition 1 (standard policy). A standard policy is a KBP in which the last action executed before any branching if Φ or while Φ is an epistemic action a such that Φ is some Kϕi ∈ Ωa.
1 The reader has certainly experienced the situation where the screen of her laptop, connected to a videoprojector, appears on a screen in front of everyone and each of her actions (reading email, inspecting the contents of a directory. . . ) could possibly reveal some information she does not want everyone to see.
Hence evaluating a branching condition of a standard policy at execution time only requires to compare the feedback just obtained to the branching condition Φ. Particular cases of standard policies are policies for partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), which alternate the following steps: (i) taking an (ontic) action, (ii) receiving an observation about the current state, and (iii) branching on the observation received. Observe however that our definition is more general, in that the alternation between decision and observation+branching steps is unrestricted, and that loops are allowed. For instance, our definition also encompasses sequential plans (of the form a1; a2; . . . ; an), but also controllers with finite memory [4] .
Clearly, for every initial knowledge state M O and every KBP π, there is a standard policy equivalent to π in M 0 . Such a policy can be obtained by simulating all possible executions of π in M 0 and, for each one, evaluating all (epistemic) branching conditions. We only give an example here (a formal definition is given in the Appendix -Definition 4 and Proposition 11).
Example 2. The standard policy associated with π and M 0 in Example 1 is the following:
Such translations are of course not guaranteed to be polynomial, which raises the issue whether KBPs are more succinct than standard policies. We first give a formal definition of succinctness.
Definition 2 (succinctness). Let C = (Cn)n∈N be a class of KBPs (or standard policies), and let P = (Pn)n∈N be a family of planning problems. Then C is said to be succinct for P if there is a polynomial p : N → N and a family (πn)n∈N of KBPs satisfying πn ∈ Cn, |πn| ∈ O(p(n)), and such that πn is a valid plan for Pn.
A class C is said to be as succinct as a class C if for all families P of planning problems such that C is succinct for P, C is also succinct for P. It is said to be more succinct than C if in addition, there is a family P of planning problems for which C is succinct but C is not.
Note that our definition of being more succinct is quite demanding, since not only it requires that there is no polysize KBP in C equivalent to π ∈ C, but also it requires that there is no polysize KBP which is valid for the same problem (may it be nonequivalent to π).
Clearly, because standard policies are defined as particular cases of KBPs, the latter are always at least as succinct than the former. We now show that KBPs are more succinct than standard policies, even under several restrictions. Proof. For all n ∈ N, we exhibit a KBP πn as in the claim which essentially reads a 3CNF formula over n variables (hidden in the initial state), and either makes sure that it is unsatisfiable, or builds a model. This KBP has size polynomial in n. Now assume there is a while-free standard policy π of size polynomial in |π|, and hence in n, which is a valid plan for the same problem. Then because standard policies can be executed with constant-time delay and because π is while-free, execution of π would be a (possibly nonuniform) polytime algorithm for 3SAT, yielding 3SAT ∈ P/poly and hence, NP ⊆ P/poly. The construction of the KBP πn and the definition of the knowledge-based planning problem Pn are detailed in the Appendix (Proposition 12).
Observe that the proof even shows that there are planning problems with succinct while-free KBPs (with atomic branching conditions) but with no compact while-free plan with polynomial-delay execution (cf. the notion of a compact sequential-access representation [1]). Observe however that if loops are allowed, then there does exist a compact standard policy for the 3SAT problem (for instance, the DPLL algorithm). However, it turns out that there are problems with succinct KBPs (with loops) but with no succinct standard policy at all (even with loops).
Proposition 2. KBPs are more succinct than standard policies.
Proof. There is a KBP π of size polynomial in n (in particular, manipulating a number of variables polynomial in n) with exactly one trace in some precise initial knowledge state M 0 , of size 2
Proposition 13 in the Appendix shows that given a KBP π, a planning problem P can be built efficiently, for which all valid plans are equivalent to π in M 0 (up to a polynomial number of void actions), and for which π is indeed valid. Towards a contradition, assume that there is a valid standard policy π for P . Then π has exactly one trace, of size 2 2 n − 1 (up to a polynomial). But if π has size polynomial in n, then it can manipulate at most n variables, and because it is a standard policy it can be in at most 2 n |π | different configurations (values of variables plus control point).
Hence it cannot have a terminating trace of length greater than 2 n |π|, a contradiction.
We conclude this section by considering the succintness gap induced by loops in KBPs.
Proposition 3. KBPs are more succinct than while-free KBPs.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that for each KBP π, there is an equivalent while-free KBP π satisfying |π | ≤ p(|π|). Then there is an algorithm showing that verifying a KBP (with loops) is a problem in Σ P 3 (Proposition 14 in the Appendix). Since on the other hand we know that verifying an unrestricted KBP is an EXPSPACEhard problem [11, Proposition 6], we get a contradiction with Σ P 3 ⊆ PSPACE EXPSPACE (Savitch's theorem). Finally, given a polynomial-size KBP π for which there is no equivalent polynomial-size while-free KBP, we build a problem which has only π and equivalent KBPs as valid plans (Proposition 13 in the Appendix), and this problem shows that KBPs are more succinct than while-free KBPs.
COMPLEXITY OF PLAN EXISTENCE
We now consider the problem of deciding whether there exists a valid KBP for a given planning problem. Since the main benefit of using KBPs is to get succinct (and readable) plans, we insist on the "small KBP existence" problem, where we ask whether there exists a valid KBP within a given size bound.
Definition 3 (existence). The plan existence problem takes as input a knowledge-based planning problem P = (I, AO, AE, G) and asks whether there exists a valid KBP π for P . The bounded size plan existence problem takes as input a knowledge-based planning problem P = (I, AO, AE, G) and an integer k encoded in unary, and asks whether there exists a KBP π for P satisfying |π| ≤ k.
We start with the complexity of plan existence, that is, without a size bound.
Proposition 4. Plan existence is 2-EXPTIME-complete.
It is EXPSPACE-complete if only ontic actions are allowed.
Proof. The first two results follow from the fact that there is a valid KBP for a given knowledge-based planning problem P if and only if there is a valid standard policy for P (Proposition 11 in the Appendix), together with known results by Rintanen [18] and by Haslum and Jonsson [8] .
Proposition 5. While-free KBP existence restricted to epistemic actions is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Write WFE-Existence for the problem of whilefree KBP existence. We introduce a variant, called WFOEExistence (for "While-Free Ordered Epistemic"), in which a total order < on AE is given as an additional input, and the question is whether there is a valid KBP for P , in which actions occur in the order < in any execution. Then we show QBF ≤ P WFOE-Existence ≤ P WFE-Existence. The reductions are given in the Appendix (Propositions 17 and 18). Because QBF is PSPACE-complete, it follows that WFE-Existence is PSPACE-hard. Finally, because only epistemic actions are available, the state never changes, and hence executing the same epistemic action twice in an execution is useless. It follows that we are essentially searching for a tree of height at most |AE|, and membership in PSPACE easily follows.
Proposition 6. While-free KBP existence restricted to epistemic actions and positive goals is coNP-complete.
Proof. This proof is essentially by a reduction to validity in S5 (Proposition 16 in the Appendix).
Proposition 7. Bounded KBP existence is EXPSPACEcomplete.
Proof. For hardness, we reduce the problem of verifying that a KBP π is valid for a planning problem P = (I, AO, AE, G) to plan existence, by building a planning problem P with bound k = |π| for which π is valid if and only if it is valid for P , and every valid plan is equivalent to π. For this we use Proposition 13 with the construction initialized with I and G. Hence if π is valid for P , then P has a plan of size at most k (namely, π), and if π is not valid for P , then P has no valid plan. Because verification is an EXPSPACE-hard problem [11, Proposition 6], we get hardness. Membership follows from the fact that a plan π can be guessed, that verifying that it is valid is in EXPSPACE [11, Proposition 6 again], and from NEXPSPACE = EXPSPACE (Savitch's theorem). Proof. Because there is no feedback, there is no need for branching, therefore there is a plan of size at most k if and only if there is a valid plan which is a sequence of at most k actions. The bounded KBP existence problem is therefore equivalent to the bounded plan existence problem, which is known to be Σ P 2 -complete [2] if the goal is positive atomic. Now membership in Σ P 2 in the general case follows from the fact that verifying a plan can be done by computing the memoryful progression [11] in polynomial time, then checking that it entails the goal using a coNP-oracle.
As for purely epistemic planning problems, things are easy only in the case of positive goals.
Proposition 10. While-free bounded KBP existence restricted to epistemic actions and to positive goals is Σ P 2 -complete.
Proof. Since the goal Γ is positive epistemic and the state cannot change, executing more epistemic actions cannot render a valid plan invalid. In particular, removing all branching conditions and linearizing a valid plan gives a valid plan. Hence there is a valid plan of size ≤ k if and only if there is a sequence of k epistemic actions which is a valid plan. Hence the problem can be solved by guessing a plan a1; . . . ; ak and checking k i=1 ( Kϕ j ∈Ωa i ϕj) |= Γ, which can be done by a call to a coNP-oracle. Now for hardness, we give a reduction from QBF2,∃ (Proposition 20 in the Appendix).
CONCLUSION
Our contributions are twofold. First, we have made formal the succinctness gap obtained by the possibility to branch on complex epistemic formulas instead of simply branching on observations. Second, we have obtained several nontrivial results on the complexity of KBP existence for a planning problem. The results are synthesized in the table below. Note that as far as unbounded KBP existence is concerned, whether loops are allowed or not does not make a difference: since valid plans are required to stop, every valid KBP with loops can be rewritten into an equivalent while-free KBP. This remark helps us having all cells of the left column filled. unbounded bounded general 2-EXPTIME-c. EXPSPACE-c. while-free (wf) 2-EXPTIME-c. Σ • if π is the empty KBP, then f (π, M 0 ) is the empty standard policy, Proof. It is easily shown by induction on the structure of π that for every possible outcome (resp. feedback) of an ontic (resp. epistemic) action taken in π, the iterated progression of M 0 by π or f (π, M 0 ) are the same.
Proposition 12. There is a family of planning problems P = (Pn)n∈N for which there is a succinct family of whilefree KBPs (πn)n∈N, and any family of KBPs for P is a (possibly nonuniform) family of algorithms for 3SAT.
Proof. Let n ∈ N, implicitly defining a set of n Boolean variables and the SAT problem for 3CNF formulas over n variables. The variables and actions involved in the construction of πn are the following:
• n unobservable Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn, intuitively storing an assignment x to the variables of a 3CNF formula (this assignment is arbitrary and unknown to the agent),
• O(n 3 × 3 log n) Boolean variables i,j,k (i = 1, . . . , n 3 , j = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, . . . , log n), intuitively encoding a 3CNF formula ϕ ( i,j,k represents the kth bit of the encoding of the literal in position j in the ith clause) ; the value of these variables, i.e., the 3CNF formula, is arbitrary, but can be "read" by a KBP through epistemic actions test( i,j,k ),
• an unobservable variable s ("satisfied") which is necessarily false if x does not satisfy ϕ ; to model this, the initial knowledge state is defined to be
where χi is true if and only if x satisfies the ith clause of ϕ (that is, χi is
where i,j = x is appropriately encoded over the "bits" The goal Gn of the planning problem Pn is either to know that s is false (Ks) or to know that x is a model of ϕ (K( x |= ϕ), expressed using a formula using the variables χi as above).
We claim that the KBP πn defined as follows is a valid plan for Pn:
Indeed, because the value of s cannot change during the execution, s is guaranteed to be false if and only if the (arbitrary) initial assignment x does not satisfy ϕ. Because the initial value of x cannot be observed, this is true if and only if ϕ is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, by definition an assignment to x can be built which satisfies ϕ. Finally, Pn encodes 3SAT for formulas of n variables, and πn is a valid plan for it.
Proposition 13. Given a KBP π and an initial knowlege state M 0 , one can build a knowledge-based planning problem P = (I, AO, AE, G) in time polynomial in |π|, so that π is valid for P and all KBPs which are valid for P are equivalent to π (up to additional variables in P and to a polynomial number of void actions).
Proof. Using a polynomial number of void actions (with theory Σ = x∈X x ↔ x for ontic actions and Ω = {K } for epistemic actions), we first normalize π so that it starts with an ontic action, then epistemic and ontic actions alternate, and finally that only ontic actions occur right before and right after any occurrence of if Φ then , else , endif , while Φ do , and endwhile . By duplicating actions, we also ensure that any action is used at most once in π; for example, we duplicate a to a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , with Σ a i = Σa, for the first, second, and third occurrences of a in π. All these steps can clearly be performed in polynomial time.
We now describe how I, AO, AE, and G are computed from π. The constructions are performed iteratively, starting with I = M 0 , AO (resp. AE) being the set of ontic (resp. epistemic) actions occurring in π, and G = K .
We describe in details how to handle the case when π is a sequence of actions. Handling of branching and loops will be described more briefly, but relies on the same techniques. So let π = a1; . . . ; ak with a1, a3, . . . being ontic actions and  a2, a4, . . . being epistemic actions.
We first introduce two fresh variables, ok and s, and replace I with I ∧ Kok and G with G ∧ Kok ∧ ¬(Ks ∨ Ks). Intuitively, ok is known to be true at the beginning and must be known to be true at the end, but taking any ontic action at another moment than π does will assign it to false as a side-effect. Now the value of s (standing for "secret") is not known initially and must not be known at the end, but taking any epistemic action at another moment than π does will reveal its value. Now for each sequence of actions ai; ai+1; ai+2 in π, where ai, ai+2 are ontic and ai+1 is epistemic, we introduce two fresh variables, ri+1 (standing for "ready" to execute ai+1) and pi+2. Intuitively, ai will assign ri+1 to 1, and ai+1 will reveal the value of pi+2 (only in case ri+1 is known to be true). Then ai+2 is duplicated into two actions, exactly one of which has to be chosen, depending on the value of pi+2. In this manner, we force ai+2 to occur only after a sequence ai; ai+1 in any valid plan.
More precisely, in AO and AE we:
• replace Σa i with Σa i ∧ r i+1 ,
• replace ai+2 with two ontic actions, namely a p i+2 and ap i+2 defined by
and make them reinitialize pi+2, that is, the frame ax-
Note that because the process is iterated, the first transformation is in fact applied to Σ a p i
and Σ ap i . Moreover, for any other epistemic action a = ai+1, we
• replace Ωa with {K(ϕ ∧ (ri+1 → s )) | Kϕ ∈ Ωa, = 0, 1} or, in the general case where this transformation has already been performed for ri 1 , . . . , ri k , we replace it with
Finally, for handling the last action we introduce a fresh variable stop, and we replace I with I ∧ stop, G with G ∧ Kstop, Σa k with Σa k ∧ stop , we replace ok ↔ ok ∧ p i with ok ↔ ok ∧ p i ∧ stop in all other (ontic) action theories, and duplicate each feedback Kω in other action theories into K(ω ∧ (stop → s )), = 0, 1. For handling the first action, we replace I with I ∧ Kr1, addr1 to σa 1 , and add feedbacks Kr1 → s , = 0, 1, to all epistemic actions.
We now claim that P as defined above has (a plan equivalent to) π as a valid plan, and that any other valid plan for it is equivalent to π (in both cases, up to void actions and additional variables).
As regards validity of π, consider the plan π obtained from π by replacing all subsequences ai; ai+1; ai+2 with ai; ai+1; if Kpi+2 then a p i+2 else ap i+2 endif Then clearly, when execution comes to ai+1, ri+1 is true (and known to be so), hence one of the feedbacks K(ri+1 → p i+2 ) is obtained, revealing the truth value of pi+2. Hence a p i+2 or ap i+2 is correctly chosen for preserving achievement of the goal Kok . Moreover, because for all j < i, the value of rj has been reinitialized by action aj, the feedback of ai+1 gives no clue about the value of s (through K(rj → s )), preserving the goal ¬(Ks ∨ Ks).
Now let π be any plan which is valid for P , and consider a fixed sequence of outcomes for ontic actions and feedbacks for epistemic actions, with the aim of showing that π takes (up to void actions) the same actions as π, in the same order. The proof works by induction.
First assume that π takes an ontic action ai = a1 as its first action. Then because of the effect ok → ri and since the value of ri is not known in the initial state I, the goal Kok is not preserved. Since no action allows to set it back, this is a contradiction with the validity of π . Now assume that π takes an epistemic action ai as its first action. Then because r1 is true in the initial state, ai reveals the value of s, a contradiction again since this value cannot change along the execution. Moreover, by construction the knowledge state resulting from taking a1 satisfies Kr1 and Kr2, no variable ri (i = 2) is known to be true in it, and the value of no variable pi is known.
We now consider the second action taken by π . Because r1 is false this cannot be a1, and because the value of pi is known for no i, this cannot be a p i nor ap i , for any ontic action ai. Hence this is an epistemic action, but because r2 is true this can only be a2 (otherwise the value of s would be revealed). Now by construction, the resulting knowledge state satisfies Kr1 and Kr2, no variable ri (i = 2) is known to be true in it, the value of p3 is known in it, and finally the value of no other pi is known.
Finally consider the third action taken by π . Taking any ontic action other than a p 3 or ap 3 would result in a blind choice of a p i or ap i since the value of pi (i = 3) is not known. Now taking an epistemic action other than a2 would reveal the value of s (since r2 is known to be true). Finally, either π takes a2 again, which amounts to a void action, or it takes a3. Now by construction, after a3 is taken the knowledge state satisfies Kr4, no variable ri (i = 4) is known to be true (since a3 assigns r3 to false), and the value of no pi is known (since a3 reinitializes p3). Hence we are in the same situation as after the first action has been taken, and the induction goes on, which concludes for KBPs π which are simple sequences of actions.
We now briefly show how to handle subprograms of the form and as in the case of sequences, we add feedbacks to all epistemic actions, so that they reveal the value of s if executed when r b,c is known to be true. The construction ensures that executing b while Kϕ is not true results in ¬Kok , hence violating the goal, and that executing c while Kϕ is true results in Kf , again violating the goal. The fact that the two occurrences of a refer to exactly the same action simulate a "goto" construct and hence, ensure that a valid plan loops when necessary. Proof. Let p be a polynomial such that for all KBPs π, there is an equivalent while-free KBP π satisfying |π | ≤ p(|π|). Then given a KBP π and a planning problem P , verifying that π is valid for P can be done by the following algorithm, which essentially guesses an equivalent while-free π and verifies it instead of directly verifying π:
1. guess a while-free KBP π of size at most p(|π|), 2. check that π and π are equivalent; the complement can be decided as follows:
(a) guess a trace τ of size |π | and the corresponding sequence of outcomes of ontic actions and feedbacks of epistemic actions, (b) from the outcomes and feedbacks, compute the corresponding trace of π, (c) check that at some point, π and π are not in the same knowledge state, 3. verify that π is valid for P .
The traces in Item 2 can be represented in space polynomial in |π | using memoryful progression [11] . Checking that π and π are in different knowledge states at some point can be done by verifying that their memoryful progressions are not equivalent over the variables of this timepoint, which is a problem in Σ P 2 (guess a disagreeing assignment and check that it can be extended to a model of one progression but none of the other).
Finally, Item 2 can be solved by a call to a Σ Proof. We give a reduction from QBF 2,∃. Let ∀a1 . . . an∃b1 . . . ∃bpϕ be a QBF formula. We define an epistemic planning problem P = (I, ∅, AE, G) by: Proof. We first show membership. Because the goal is positive, it is easy to see that adding epistemic actions cannot render a valid plan invalid, and hence the problem amounts to deciding whether performing all actions in sequence constitutes a valid plan π. Because there are no ontic actions, and hence the state never changes, this amounts to checking that the formula a∈A E ( Kϕ i ∈Ωa ϕi) entails G. We conclude by observing that this formula has size polynomial in |AE| and that the entailment test is one in propositional logic, hence in coNP.
Hardness follows from the following reduction from Unsatisfiability: a propositional formula ϕ is unsatisfiable if and only if the planning problem with no action, initial knowledge state K and goal K¬ϕ has a plan.
Proposition 17. There is a polynomial-time reduction from QBF to WFOE-Existence.
Proof. Let ψ = ∃a1∀b1 . . . ∃ak∀bkϕ be a QBF, where a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk are Boolean variables (restricting the quantifiers to scope over only one variable is without loss of generality, since any QBF can be rewritten in this manner by introducing dummy variables). We define the following instance P = (I, ∅, AE, G, <) of WFOE-Existence, where intuitively ai (resp.āi) is encoded by "revealing the value of xi" (resp. "not revealing the value of xi"), and bi (resp. bi) is encoded by "yi is (known to be) true" (resp. false):
• Assume first that there is a strategy σ witnessing the validity of ψ, and build a KBP π from σ by:
• replacing any decision node ai ← 1 with the action test(xi), • replacing any decision node ai ← 0 with the empty KBP, • replacing any branching node on bi with 1-child σ1 and 0-child σ0 with the KBP test(yi); if Kyi then π1 else π0 endif where π1 (resp. π0) is obtained recursively from σ1 (resp. σ0).
Clearly, the order of actions in π follows <. Now by construction, test(xi) (resp. test(yi)) is the only action revealing the value of xi (resp. yi), and validity of π for P follows. Conversely, let π be a KBP for P , and let πN be its normalized, equivalent KBP, obtained by Without loss of generality, we assume n = p (otherwise we add dummy variables). We define an instance P = (I, AO, AE, G) of while-free bounded KBP existence by:
) assigns 1 (resp. 0) to ai and, as a side effect, nondeterministically reassigns all bj's, -γ
Assume that ψ is a positive instance of qbf 3,∃ . Clearly, π is a valid plan for P , and its size is 2n + (|ϕ| + 3)q.
Conversely, assume I is a negative instance of QBF3,∃, that is, for every assignment a ∈ 2 {a 1 ,...,an} there is an assignment g( a) ∈ 2 {b 1 ,...,bp} such that for each c ∈ 2 {c 1 ,...,cq } , ag( a) c satisfies ¬ϕ. We claim that there is no valid plan π for P -and a fortiori, no valid plan of size at most ≤ 2n + (|ϕ| + 3)q. Indeed, assume there is a plan π for P .
First, the only way of knowing the truth value of the bi's it to perform test(ai ↔ bi) after an action α Proposition 20. While-free bounded KBP existence restricted to epistemic actions and to positive goals is Σ P 2 -hard. Proof. We give a reduction from QBF 2,∃ . Let ψ = ∃a1 . . . an∀b1 . . . ∃bpϕ be a QBF formula. We build a planning problem P as follows:
• we use propositional symbols a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bp, c, d1, . . . , dn, • AE = {α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn} defined by the feedback theories
If ψ is valid then let a ∈ 2 {a 1 ,...,an} be an assignment which witnesses this fact. Let π the KBP γ1; . . . ; γn, where γi is αi if a assigns 1 to ai, and γi is βi if it assigns 0 to it. After every possible execution of π, either the agent knows c, or it knows i (c → a); in the latter case, because a b |= ϕ for all b, the agent knows c → ϕ, hence in both cases the second part of the goal is satisfied. Finally, by construction the agent knows the truth value of each di, and hence π is a valid plan containing exactly n actions.
Conversely, assume that there is a valid plan of size ≤ n. Because the agent must learn the truth value of each di, π must contain αi or βi for each i, and since π is of size n, it contains exactly one of αi or βi for each i. Now consider the execution of π in which the sequence of observations is of the form K(c → a 
